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Abstract
We provide a framework for identifying utility midpoints from preferences, by assuming
that payoffs are vectors and that preferences are additively separable. This construction of
utility midpoints allows us to define mixtures of acts in a purely subjective fashion, without
making any assumptions as to the decision maker’s reaction to the uncertainty that may be
present. Indeed, we do not require any (subjective or objective) uncertainty to obtain the
identification. We show that this framework makes it possible to provide a simple and fully
subjective characterization of the second-order subjective expected utility model, and that it
allows a clear distinction of such model from subjective expected utility.
1 Introduction
The pervasiveness of the Anscombe-Aumann (1963) setting for decision models is due to the pres-
ence of an objective “mixture-space” structure on the choice set, which makes it easy to formulate
axioms with a direct mathematical counterpart and to invoke standard results from functional
analysis. On the other hand, the existence of such objective mixture structure limits the scope
of preferences that can be formally captured within an Anscombe-Aumann setting. This tension
gives rise to a challenge: to identify a mixture-space structure which does not impose strong re-
strictions on preferences and on individuals’ reactions to the uncertainty present in the choice
problem.
In this paper, we develop a subjective mixture-space structure which is totally independent of
the uncertainty of the problem, only imposing restrictions on preferences which are standard in
economic models. We assume that payoffs are vector-valued and that preferences are additively
separable over vector coordinates —as would be the case, say, if payoffs were (finite-horizon) con-
sumption streams and the decision maker discounted future utilities geometrically or hyperboli-
cally. In this context, we develop a procedure for identifying “utility midpoints” from preferences:
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for any two vectors a and b, we show how to find a vector c, the utility of which is halfway between
the utility of a and the utility of b. Utility midpoints are then used recursively to super-impose a
mixture-space structure on the set of payoffs, which is clearly subjective (and in general different
from any vector-space structure that may exist on consequences).
The assumption of additive separability plays a dual role in this paper. On one hand, it pro-
vides us with a testable method for identifying utility midpoints from behavior (details below).
On the other hand, it implies the cardinality of the utility function. Cardinality is crucial to our
exercise as it makes the definition of utility midpoints and subjective mixtures meaningful. It is
also key in the identification of risk attitude, as it is traditionally defined (i.e. the shape of the
utility function). Our derivation of cardinality via additive separability has the additional advan-
tage of imposing no restrictions on the decision maker’s reaction to uncertainty in the decision
problem.1 As a consequence, we obtain a fully subjective axiomatization of the second-order sub-
jective expected utility (SOSEU) model, which is otherwise hard to behaviorally distinguish from
the standard subjective expected utility (SEU) model (see Strzalecki, 2011).
In brief, our analysis proceeds as follows. As mentioned, the consequences of the decision
problem are elements of a product space
∏
i Xi ; e.g., consumption streams. We begin by assum-
ing that the decision maker’s preferences over such consequences are represented by an addi-
tively separable (and cardinally unique) utility U . That is, U (x1, . . . , xn) = ∑ni=1 ui (xi ). Then, we
introduce the notion of preference midpoint of two consequences. To provide intuition, consider
first the case in which consequences are 2-dimensional and homogeneous and they are treated
symmetrically by the decision maker: d = (x1, x2) ∈ X ×X and U (d)= u(x1)+u(x2). Consider two
(constant) consequences a = (x, x) and b = (y, y). In this case, the vector c = (x, y) provides an
intuitive “mixture” of the vectors a = (x, x) and b = (y, y). And indeed:
U (c)= u(x)+u(y)=
(
1
2
u(x)+ 1
2
u(x)
)
+
(
1
2
u(y)+ 1
2
u(y)
)
= 1
2
U (a)+ 1
2
U (b)
So c = (x, y) is also a “midpoint” in terms of utility of the vectors a and b. Notice that a similar
property is satisfied by the mirror-image vector c ′ = (y, x), so that c = (x, y)∼ (y, x)= c ′. Therefore,
in the special case of homogeneous and symmetric coordinates, the utility midpoint of a = (x, x)
1Alternative methods to the construction of a cardinal utility that make such restrictions are, for example, Nau
(2006); Ergin and Gul (2009); Gul (1992); Ghirardato et al. (2003); Ghirardato and Pennesi (2018). See the discussion
in Section 1.1.
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Figure 1: Looking for preference midpoints
and b = (y, y) can be directly observed from preferences.
The intuition extends to the case of non-constant payoff vectors and, more generally, to the
case in which consequences belong to a non-homogeneous product space X1×X2. Consider the
left panel of Figure 1 and the points a = (z1, z2) and b = (y1, y2). Neither (z1, y2) nor (y1, z2) provide
a “midpoint” of a and b, and indeed (z1, y2) 6∼ (y1, z2). However, this does not mean that we cannot
find a midpoint of a and b. We can do so by moving along the indifference curves A and B that
include a and b, respectively. Consider the right panel of Figure 1, where we keep the point b fixed
and find a point a′ = (x1, x2) belonging to A such that (y1, x2) ∼ (x1, y2) and therefore U (y1, x2) =
1
2U (y1, y2)+ 12U (x1, x2). That is, (y1, x2) is a midpoint of a′ and b, and therefore also a midpoint of
a and b. This shows that the intuition of “mixing” coordinates provided above can be extended to
many2 pairs of point in X1×X2.
Once midpoints are defined for a generic pair of consequences a and b, a recursive applica-
tion allows us to define the γ : (1−γ) mixture of a and b for any dyadic rational γ ∈ [0,1]. As in
Ghirardato et al. (2003), we can use this mixture notion to provide a subjective structure on the set
of consequences extending it à la Anscombe-Aumann to define “subjective mixtures” over the set
of acts (functions from states of the world to consequences).
As a first application of such subjective mixtures, we propose a purely subjective axiomatiza-
2As we discuss in detail in Section 3, there might be still pairs of consequences for which the “mixing” technique
does not identify midpoints. In those cases, an appropriate (finite) iteration of the procedure just sketched can be
used to behaviorally identify midpoints.
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tion of the Monotone, Bernoullian and Archimedean (MBA) preferences of Cerreia-Vioglio et al.
(2011), obtained without assuming the existence of an objective randomization device. We recall
that the class of MBA preferences includes, as special cases, most of the models of choice under
ambiguity (see Section 5). In our second and main application, we provide a simple axiomatic
characterization of the SOSEU model, which includes Multiplier Preferences (Hansen and Sar-
gent, 2001). In so doing, we prove that it is possible to behaviorally distinguish the SEU model
from the SOSEU model, even in a fully subjective setting. Such distinction is impossible without
ancillary assumptions, such as the existence of an objective randomization device (Grant et al.,
2009; Cerreia-Vioglio et al., 2012) or, more generally, the existence of an unambiguous source of
uncertainty (Nau, 2006; Ergin and Gul, 2009).
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 spells out the basic assumptions on preferences,
the definition of utility and preference midpoint, and it also contains our main characterization
result. Section 3 provides intuition for the existence and identification of utility midpoints. Sec-
tion 4 presents some examples of the identification of midpoints and extends the notion of mid-
points to single dimensions. Section 5 concludes by providing the main decision-theoretic ap-
plications with the axiomatizations of MBA preferences and of the SOSEU model. The appendix
contains a few additional results and all the proofs of the results in the paper.
1.1 Related literature
The two works that are most directly related to this paper are: Kochov (2015) and Vind and Gro-
dal (2003). The work of Kochov (2015) shares our objective of using the separability of preferences
over consequences to provide a fully subjective axiomatization of some preference models. In par-
ticular, he axiomatizes the Variational Preference model of Maccheroni et al. (2006) assuming that
acts are functions from states of the world to infinite horizon consumption streams. His approach
does not require the existence of an objective randomization device, but it crucially depends on
the infiniteness of the time-horizon and on geometric discounting of future utilities. Our work
complements and extends Kochov’s in two directions: first, we derive our results assuming a finite
product of possibly non-homogeneous sets. Second, we dispense with the stationarity assump-
tion implied by geometric discounting, since we only require additive separability of preferences
over consumption streams (outcomes). Another difference is that Kochov (2015) provides an ex-
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tension of his model to an explicitly dynamic setting, which we do not attempt in this paper.3
The work of Vind and Grodal (2003) is directly related to our main theoretical contribution
(Theorem 1). We adopt their notion of preference midpoint and show that it can be used to pro-
vide a foundation to the notion of utility midpoints. As we explain in detail in Section 3, preference
midpoints may not always exist. In contrast, we prove the general existence of utility midpoints
and we present a finite algorithm for their behavioral identification. Another difference is that
the general aim of Vind and Grodal (2003) is studying conditions under which preferences have
an additively separable representation: Midpoints are not defined with the objective of building a
mixture-space structure.
Our construction of subjective mixtures is complementary to those that propose subjective
mixture operators using bets on “special” events. For example, Gul (1992) directly assumes the
existence of an event with subjective probability 12 to identify utility midpoints for SEU prefer-
ences; Ghirardato et al. (2003) and Ghirardato and Pennesi (2018) show that utility midpoints can
be identified for very general classes of preferences observing choices over bets on events that are
suitably well-behaved. As the title of this paper suggests, we can identify utility midpoints even in
the absence of any uncertainty.
2 Midpoints
Here we present our main definition and its behavioral characterization. We first consider the case
in which the set of consequences is a binary product space V = X1×X2, but this will be seen to be
without loss of generality (as long as the consequence space is finite-dimensional). We denote by
a ∈V a generic vector in V .
More crucial is the following basic assumption on preferences, which is necessary to obtain a
well-defined notion of midpoint in terms of utility in our setting.
Definition 1. The binary relation< has a Continuous Additively Separable (CAS) representation if
there are U : V →R and convex-ranged ui : Xi →R for i = 1,2 such that
U (a)= u1(x1)+u2(x2)
3Although a dynamic extension of our analysis along the lines of Ghirardato and Pennesi (2018) is possible.
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represents <. The function U is cardinally unique; i.e., if U ′ also represents <, there are α > 0 and
β ∈R such that U ′ =αU +β.
The axioms characterizing such a representation are standard and therefore omitted (see, for
example, Krantz et al., 1971). As an obvious example, suppose that V is a set of two-period con-
sumption streams over the same final consumption space V = X × X , and suppose that prefer-
ences over V are represented by discounted utility, U (a) = u(x1)+δu(x2), with u convex-ranged
and δ ∈ (0,1]. This is a CAS preference.
Remark 1. As mentioned earlier, our theory can also be extended to include preferences over
an n-dimensional product space V = ∏ni=1 Xi , as long as the preference < admits an additively
separable representation with at least two addends. More precisely, Theorem 1 below holds as
long as there is a partition {I , I c } of {1, . . . ,n} such that< is represented by
U (a)= u¯I (aI )+ u¯I c (aI c ) (1)
where u¯I :
∏
i∈I Xi → R and u¯I c :
∏
j∈I c X j → R. For example, general quasi-linear preferences
U (x1, . . . , xn)= u1(x1)+ f (x2, . . . , xn), or the strongly-separable preferences4 of Goldman and Uzawa
(1964) satisfy condition (1). Obviously, this will be true a fortiori if < has a representation that is
additively separable across all the n dimensions; i.e., U (x1, . . . , xn)=∑ni=1 ui (xi ).
Given V = X1× X2 and <, we consider the quotient space [V ] = (X1× X2)/ ∼ and we denote
by A,B ∈ [V ] indifference classes and by U : [V ]→R the restriction of U to the indifference sets in
[V ]. As informally explained in the introduction, we define midpoints directly in terms of pairs of
indifference sets and then extend the definition to pairs in V .
Definition 2. For any A,B ∈ [V ], C ∈ [V ] is a utility midpoint of A and B, denoted C = A¯B, if and
only if U (C )= 12U (A)+ 12U (B).
Remark 2. The definition of utility midpoint is extended to pairs a,b ∈ V in the obvious way:
c = a¯b if and only if C = A¯B and c ∈C , a ∈ A and b ∈B .
While the definition of utility midpoint is based on the representation U , we show that there is
a finite preference-based procedure to identify C . This is the object of our main result:
4A preference over X =∏ni=1 Xi has a strongly separable representation if there exists a partition {I1, I2, . . . , IS } with
S ≥ 2 of {1,2, . . . ,n} such that U (a)= u1(a(1))+·· ·+uS (a(S)) and each us for s = 1, . . . ,S is a function of the sub-vector
a(s) ∈∏ j∈Is X j .
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Theorem 1. If< has a CAS representation then, for all A,B ∈ [V ] a utility midpoint C = A¯B exists
and it can be elicited from preferences via a finite procedure.
That is, given an arbitrary pair of consequences it is possible to use behavioral data to identify
a utility midpoint. More precisely, given a pair of points in V and their associated indifference
sets, we can identify an indifference set, each element of which yields utility equaling the average
of the utilities of the points we started from.
Our construction builds on the following behavioral definition of midpoint (illustrated in Fig-
ure 2 below), introduced by Vind and Grodal (2003).
Definition 3. For any A,B ∈ [V ], C ∈ [V ] is a preference midpoint of A and B, if and only if there
exist (x1, x2) ∈ A and (y1, y2) ∈B such that (x1, y2)∼ (y1, x2) ∈C .
Preference midpoints may not exist for arbitrary A,B ∈ [V ]. For instance, in Figure 3 below
the indifference curves A′,B ′, passing through the points (x ′1, y2) and (y
′
1, x2) respectively, do not
have a preference midpoint (Def. 3) while they do have a utility midpoint (Def. 2).5 The main
novel contribution of Theorem 1 is the development of a finite procedure that, departing from the
notion of preference midpoint, allows us to identify utility midpoints for all A,B ∈ [V ] using finitely
many preference statements. The following subsection outlines the main ideas of the procedure,
leaving the details and formal definitions to the Appendix.
3 The identification of utility midpoints: An intuition
We start by noticing that, under the CAS assumption, whenever a preference midpoint exists, it
is also a utility midpoint. Refer to Figure 2 and consider the indifference curves A,B . The indif-
ference curve C satisfies the definition of preference midpoint, because it is indeed the case that
given the points (x1, x2) ∈ A and (y1, y2) ∈B , the indifference (x1, y2)∼ (y1, x2) ∈C holds. But, using
the CAS assumption, the latter indifference is mathematically equivalent to
U (C )= u1(x1)+u2(y2)= u1(y1)+u2(x2) (2)
5In contrast, the indifference curves a,b in Fig. 3 have a preference midpoint which, under the assumption of
Theorem 1, coincides with the utility midpoint.
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Figure 2: The preference midpoint of A and B .
which implies
2U (C )= u1(x1)+u2(y2)+u1(y1)+u2(x2)
That is,
U (C )= 1
2
[u1(x1)+u2(x2)]+ 1
2
[
u1(y1)+u2(y2)
]= 1
2
U (A)+ 1
2
U (B)
An important observation is that the previous argument only works for pairs (x1, x2) ∈ A and
(y1, y2) ∈B for which we can establish the indifference (x1, y2)∼ (y1, x2), which will not be the case
for arbitrary choices of pairs of points in the indifference sets A and B . Our first result (Lemma 2)
establishes that a preference (hence utility) midpoint of A and B always exists when A and B are
intuitively “close enough.”
To understand the notion of “closeness” (again, precise definitions are provided in the Ap-
pendix) refer to Figure 3: The indifference sets A and B in the middle of the figure are “close”
because there is a pair of payoffs (z1, z2) such that the payoff z1 appears in elements of both sets A
and B (the intersections of the blue-dotted vertical line corresponding to z1 with the two curves),
and analogously for z2 (in this case the intersections of the blue-dotted horizontal line corre-
sponding to z2 with the two curves). In contrast, the indifference sets A′ and B ′ are not “close,” as
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Figure 3: Identification of utility midpoints
it is impossible to find a suitable payoff z1 (while a suitable z2 could be found).
The second result (Lemma 3) shows that CAS preferences satisfy the so-called Diagonal prop-
erty: if (x1, x2) ∈ A and (y1, y2) ∈B and C is the utility midpoint of A and B , then C is also the utility
midpoint of the sets A′ and B ′ such that U (A′)= u1(x1)+u2(y2) and U (B ′)= u1(y1)+u2(x2). Refer-
ring again to Figure 3, the Diagonal property implies that the indifference set C is also the utility
midpoint of A′ and B ′, where the latter correspond to the two points (x1, y2) ∈ A′ and (y1, x2) ∈ B ′
obtained from (x1, x2) and (y1, y2) by a coordinate switch. Reiterating the argument, C is also the
utility midpoint of A′′ and B ′′, derived from A′ and B ′ by another coordinate switch.
We can now once more refer to Figure 3 to conclude the intuitive proof of Theorem 1. Consider
two arbitrary indifference sets A′′,B ′′ ∈ [V ] such that A′′ Â B ′′. It is possible to show that we can
find vectors belonging to A′′ and B ′′ that are Pareto ranked, such as (y ′1, x2) ∈ B ′′ and (x ′1, y2) ∈ A′′.
We can then use coordinate switches to construct a finite sequence of pairs of indifference sets
{(An ,Bn)} ∈ [V ]× [V ] such that eventually An and Bn are “close enough,” and hence have a utility
midpoint C . By the Diagonal property, C is also the utility midpoint of the initial A′′ and B ′′.
4 Examples and discussion
4.1 Preference and utility midpoints: some examples
In this subsection, we provide some models of CAS preferences and show how to directly identify
preference and utility midpoints for such models.
Example 1 (Two-period consumption). Suppose < has the discounted utility representation on
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two-period consumption streams V = X 2 mentioned earlier. Then, for A,B ∈ [V ], the preference
midpoint C of A,B is such that, for some (x1, x2) ∈ A and (y1, y2) ∈B , (x1, y2), (y1, x2) ∈C and u(x1)+
δu(y2)= u(y1)+δu(x2). Equivalently, δ= u(x1)−u(y1)u(x2)−u(y2) . Geometrically, we can interpret δ as the slope
of the line passing through the points (u(x1),u(x2)) and (u(y1),u(y2)). Fixing (x1, x2) ∈ A and given
δ and u, we can define the set MA of all points (y1, y2) ∈V satisfying δ= u(x1)−u(y1)u(x2)−u(y2) . The elements
of MA can be “mixed” with (x1, x2) ∈ A according to Definition 3; that is, there exists a preference
midpoint of each element of MA with (x1, x2). For points (y1, y2) ∈V not belonging to MA, one can
still use indifferences and/or the procedure developed in the proof of Theorem 1 to identity the
utility midpoints.
Example 2 (Two-dimensional weighted attributes). A simple generalization of the previous ex-
ample is when V = X1×X2 interpreted, for example, as a product with 2 attributes. An additively
separable representation of< is given by U (a)=α1u1(x1)+α2u2(x2). Then, for two A,B ∈ [V ], the
preference midpoint C of A,B is such that, for some (x1, x2) ∈ A and (y1, y2) ∈B , (x1, y2), (y1, x2) ∈C
and α1u1(x1)+α2u2(y2)=α1u1(y1)+α2u2(x2). Equivalently α2α1 =
u1(x1)−u1(y1)
u2(x2)−u2(y2) , and the ratio
α2
α1
has
a geometric interpretation analogous to that of δ in the previous example.
Example 3 (State-dependent expected utility). Suppose that V = X S , where S represents a finite
set of states of the world and a ∈V is an act. A state-dependent expected utility is a CAS represen-
tation of a preference < defined on V : U (a) =∑s∈S p(s)us(xs), where p(s) ≥ 0 and ∑s∈S p(s) = 1.
The preference midpoint C of A,B ∈ [V ] is the class of indifference of acts such that U (C ) =
1
2U (A)+ 12U (B). In the special case of |S| = 2, the preference midpoint C of A,B is such that,
for some (x1, x2) ∈ A and (y1, y2) ∈ B , (x1, y2), (y1, x2) ∈ C and p(s1)u1(x1)+ (1− p(s1))u2(y2) =
p(s1)u1(y1)+ (1− p(s1))u2(x2). Equivalently 1−p(s1)p(s1) =
u1(x1)−u1(y1)
u2(x2)−u2(y2) , and the ratio
1−p(s1)
p(s1)
has again
a geometric interpretation analogous to that of δ in the first example.
Example 4 (Social welfare under uncertainty). Suppose that V = X n and a ∈ V represents an al-
location of resources to n individuals, with< representing the social welfare ranking. A weighted
utilitarian welfare function is a CAS representation of <: U (a) =∑ni=1αi ui (xi ), where αi ≥ 0 and∑
i αi = 1. The preference midpoint of A and B is a set of allocations C such that a = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) ∈
A and b = (y1, y2, . . . , yn) ∈ B and c = (z1, z2, . . . , zn) ∼ (z¯1, z¯2, . . . , z¯n) ∈ C where zi = xi , yi , and
zi = xi implies z¯i = yi and viceversa. A preference midpoint C exists when there exists at least
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one exchange of coordinates between elements of a and b that makes the new allocations indif-
ferent. For example, take n = 3 and assume U (a)=α1u1(x1)+α2u2(x2)+α3u3(x3)= 3+2+1 and
U (b)=α1u1(y1)+α2u2(y2)+α3u3(y3)= 5+1+2. Then C = A¯B where (x1, x2, y3)∼ (y1, y2, x3) ∈C
and U (c)= 7. We notice that, when the number of coordinate n is bigger than 2, the identification
of preference midpoints is easier with respect to n = 2.
4.2 A simple sufficient condition for the existence of preference midpoints
As we observed earlier, while utility midpoints exist for any pair A and B of indifference sets, this is
not the case for preference midpoints. That is, given two arbitrary vectors (x1, x2) ∈ A and (y1, y2) ∈
B , a preference midpoint of (x1, x2) and (y1, y2) may not exist. Here, we introduce a sufficient
condition for the existence of preference midpoints of two such vectors, which is a particular case
of the informal notion of “closeness” we introduced in Section 3 (formally defined in Definition
9). The key property is given by the next condition:
Definition 4. < satisfies the Triangle condition at (y1, y2) ∈ V and (x1, x2) ∈ V if and only if there
exist z1 ∈ X1 and z2 ∈ X2 such that (y1, z2)∼ (z1, y2)∼ (x1, x2).
Figure 4 graphically illustrates the condition making it also clear that the indifference sets A
and B are “close.” The next proposition shows that the Triangle condition does the job.
Proposition 1. For arbitrary (y1, y2) and (x1, x2), if the Triangle condition holds at (y1, y2) and
(x1, x2), then there exists (x ′1, x
′
2)∼ (x1, x2) such that (y1, x ′2)∼ (x ′1, y2).
Notice that the indifference (y1, x ′2)∼ (x ′1, y2), as in Equation (2) above, guarantees that (y ′1, x2)
is a preference midpoint of (x1, x2) and (y1, y2).6
While the Triangle condition is mathematically related to the notion of “closeness” employed
above, an advantage of Definition 4 and Proposition 1 is that they are entirely formulated in terms
of vectors, rather than indifference sets. Thus, they are in principle easier to verify and implement.
4.3 Coordinate-wise midpoints and homogeneous coordinates
The utility midpoint operator ¯ allows to define coordinate-wise midpoint operators ¯1 and ¯2
which, to simplify notation, we define directly on X1 and X2, rather than on quotient spaces.
6More precisely, (x ′1, y2)∼ (y1, x ′2) ∈C and C is a preference midpoint of A 3 (x1, x2) and B 3 (y1, y2).
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Figure 4: Triangle property at (y1, y2) and (x1, x2)
Definition 5. For x, y, z ∈ X1, x¯1 y = z if and only if for some w ∈ X2, (x, w) ∈ A, (y, w) ∈B, (z, w) ∈
C and C = A¯B.
The definition of ¯2 is obtained symmetrically. Additive separability implies that, for i = 1,2,
ui (x¯i y)= 12 ui (x)+ 12 ui (y) for all x, y ∈ Xi . Hence, ¯i is a utility midpoint operator on Xi .
When coordinates are homogeneous V = X 2, coordinate mixtures can be used to compare the
“shapes” of the utilities u1,u2. The following two preference properties can be of use:
Axiom (Coordinate-wise Ordinal Symmetry - COS). For all x, y, z ∈ X , (x, z)< (y, z) if and only if
(z, x)< (z, y).
Axiom (Coordinate-wise Cardinal Symmetry - CCS). For all x, y, z ∈ X , (x¯1 y, z)∼ (x¯2 y, z).
Axiom COS does not need discussion. As to CCS, we observe that, under additive separability,
the choice of the coordinate in Axiom CCS is irrelevant (an equivalent axiom would be: for all
x, y, z ∈ X , (z, x¯2 y)∼ (z, x¯1 y)). The axiom CCS is satisfied, for example, when utilities are affine
w.r.t. to an objective mixture operation.
We have the following simple result:
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Proposition 2. Suppose < has a CAS representation on a homogeneous space V = X 2. Then, if <
satisfies CCS, there existα,β ∈R,α 6= 0, and a function u : X →R such that U (x, y)=αu(x)+u(y)+β
represents<. If< also satisfies COS, α> 0.
So, if< satisfies CCS and COS then, the utilities u1 and u2 are cardinally equivalent.
5 A general framework for the separation of ambiguity and “risk”
attitudes
This section contains the main application of the result developed above. Having defined the util-
ity midpoint operator¯, we use it to define a subjective mixture operation in a standard decision-
theoretic setting in which the choice options are functions from a state space S, endowed with an
algebra Σ, into consequences belonging to a product space V =∏i∈I Xi , with I finite.
Precisely, the decision maker has a binary relation < defined on the set F of all simple Σ-
measurable functions f : S →V . We denote by B0(Σ,Γ) the set of simple Σ-measurable functions
on S with values in the interval Γ⊆ R and we say that I : B0(Σ,Γ)→ R is: monotonic, if I (φ)≥ I (ψ)
when φ≥ψ; continuous, if it is sup-norm continuous; normalized, if I (γ1S)= γ for all γ ∈ Γ.
We assume the following basic axioms:
Axiom (Preference Order - P). < is a complete, nontrivial and transitive relation onF .
Axiom (Monotonicity - M). If f (s)< g (s) for all s ∈ S, then f < g .
Axiom (Outcome Separability - OS). The restriction of< to A has a CAS representation.
By Theorem 1 and Remark 2, the CAS assumption allows us to identify utility midpoints for
every pair of consequences, a,b ∈V . Using utility midpoints, we define the act mixture 1/2 f ⊕1/2g
for any f , g ∈F as follows: for any s ∈ S,
(
1
2
f ⊕ 1
2
g
)
(s)≡ f (s)¯ g (s) (3)
We then consider iterated act mixtures such as 12 f ⊕
(1
2 f ⊕ 12 g
)
, which corresponds to a 34 :
1
4
mixture of f and g . This is then extended by standard continuity arguments (see Appendix C in
Ghirardato et al. (2002)) to define α f ⊕ (1−α)g , for any α ∈ [0,1], so that for any s ∈ S
U [(α f ⊕ (1−α)g )(s)]=αU ( f (s))+ (1−α)U (g (s))
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Act mixtures allow us to state the next axiom, which is familiar from traditional Anscombe-
Aumann treatments:
Axiom (Full Continuity - FC). For all f , g ,h ∈F , the sets {α ∈ [0,1] :α f ⊕ (1−α)g < h} and{
α ∈ [0,1] : h<α f ⊕ (1−α)g} are closed.
Notice that, it follows from axioms P, M OS and FC that for every f ∈F there is a f ∈ V such
that a f ∼ f . That is, every act has a certainty equivalent. Adapting the argument in Cerreia-Vioglio
et al. (2011), we show that the axioms stated so far are necessary and sufficient to obtain a MBA
representation (Cerreia-Vioglio et al., 2011) for<:7
Proposition 3. Axioms P, M, OS, and FC hold if and only if there exist a CAS U : A → R, and a
monotonic, continuous and normalized functional I : B0(Σ,U (V ))→R such that
f < g ⇐⇒ I (U ( f ))≥ I (U (g ))
Notice that we do not assume Risk Independence,8 since our U is, by definition, affine with
respect to the mixture operator⊕ and cardinally unique. Following (perhaps debatable) tradition,
we interpret U as risk attitude and I as the description of the decision maker’s reaction to the
presence of uncertainty, in particular ambiguity.
The class of MBA preferences includes as special cases most of the models of ambiguity-sensitive
preferences: the Maxmin EU model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), the Variational Preferences
model of Maccheroni et al. (2006), the Confidence Preferences model of Chateauneuf and Faro
(2009), the Smooth Ambiguity model of Klibanoff et al. (2005), the Vector EU model of Siniscalchi
(2009), and the Uncertainty Averse Preferences model of Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011).
5.1 Second-order subjective expected utility
In this section, we address the question of behaviorally distinguishing the subjective expected
utility (SEU) model from the second-order SEU model of Grant et al. (2009), which includes the
popular Multiplier Preferences (Hansen and Sargent, 2001) as a special case.
7We omit the uniqueness statement, which is analogous to that in Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011).
8In the presence of an objective randomization device + on V , < satisfies Risk Independence if, for all a,b,c ∈ V
and all γ ∈ (0,1), a< b implies γa+ (1−γ)c < γb+ (1−γ)c.
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As noted in Strzalecki (2011), in a pure Savage-style setting SOSEU is observationally equiva-
lent to SEU. Hence, without a method to cardinally identify the Bernoulli utility U the two models
cannot be told apart. Two tools have been employed to solve this identification problem. The first
is the assumption of the availability of an objective randomization devices, so that consequences
belong to an objective mixture space. The second is the assumption of the existence of multi-
ple sources of uncertainty, in one of which the decision maker has SEU preferences (that is, an
unambiguous source).
We now show that when the consequence space is multidimensional and preferences satisfy
the OS axiom, the notion of utility midpoint introduced in this paper provides a third tool.
Definition 6. A binary relation< has a SOSEU representation if there exist a continuous U : V →R,
a continuous and strictly monotone φ : U (V ) → R and a p ∈ ∆(S), such that < is represented by
J :F →R defined by:
J ( f )=
∫
S
(
φ◦U ) ( f )d p
An important special case of SOSEU is the Exponential SOSEU representation defined for θ ∈
(−∞,0)∪ (0,∞]:
φθ(U )=

−exp(−U
θ
)
θ ∈ (−∞,0)∪ (0,∞)
U θ =∞
The Exponential SOSEU representation includes as a special case the popular Multiplier Prefer-
ences of Hansen and Sargent (2001), corresponding to θ ∈ (0,∞].
As shown by Grant et al. (2009), a basic axiom characterizing SOSEU is Savage’s Sure-Thing-
Principle (P2), restated below. For f , g ∈ F and E ∈ Σ, fE g denotes the act equal to f in E and
equal to g in E c :
Axiom (P2). For all E ∈Σ and acts f , g ,h,h′ ∈F , if fE h< gE h then fE h′< gE h′.
The following lemma provides a characterization of a state-dependent version of SOSEU. We
define a state s ∈ S to be null if for all f ∈F and a,b ∈V , as f ∼ bs f .
Lemma 1. Suppose there are at least 3 non-null states. A binary relation < satisfies axioms P, M,
OS, FC, and P2 if and only if there exists a non-constant U : V →Rwith range U (V ) and continuous
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weakly increasing functions φs : U (V )→R, such that< is represented by:
J ( f )=∑
s∈S
φs(U ( f (s)))
If
{
φ′s
}
s∈S also represent<, there are α> 0 and βs ∈R such that φs =αφ′s +βs .
Grant et al. (2009) provide a similar representation result. The main difference is that they
require Risk Independence, a state separability assumption which presumes the presence of ob-
jective mixtures. Instead, we only rely on vector-valued consequences and the CAS assumption.
To obtain the full-fledged SOSEU representation, we impose a further condition which im-
plies the independence of the evaluation of consequences and states. Leveraging on our previ-
ous results, we can do so without imposing restrictions on the function φ. The functional J ( f ) =∑
s∈S φs(U ( f (s))) is an additively separable representation of<over a homogeneous product space
(as assumed in Section 4.3). Therefore, since the state space S is finite and each act f ∈ F is a
vector in V |S|, by Theorem 1 and Proposition 2, there exists a midpoint operator ⊗ on [F ]. The
operator ⊗ associates an indifference class H ∈ [F ] to any pair of indifference classes F,G ∈ [F ],
so that J (H) = 1/2J (F )+1/2J (G) whenever H = F ⊗G . Given ⊗, we can define, for each s ∈ S, an
operator ⊗s on the space V as follows:
Definition 7. For any a,b,c ∈ V , c = a⊗s b if and only if for some h′ ∈F , ash′ ∈ F , bsh′ ∈G and
csh′ ∈H such that F ⊗G =H.
The construction (and interpretation) of ⊗s is the same of the operators ¯i defined in Section
4.3, with the indexes i ∈ I replaced by the states s ∈ S and the utilities ui replaced by φs ◦U . Since,
U is cardinally unique by the OS axiom, we can separately identify the state-dependent functions
φs (without cardinally identifying U , we could only cardinally identify φs ◦U ).9
Remark 3. It is important to understand that the operators ¯ and ⊗s , while both defined on V ,
are not necessarily isomorphic. For an example, consider the case V =R+×R+ and U (x, y)= x+y .
Given two vectors a = (x, x) and b = (y, y), their midpoint c = a ¯ b is such that U (c) = x + y .
However, if for example φs = ln, c ′ = a ⊗s b is such that U (c ′) = e 12 ln(2x)+ 12 ln(2y) 6=U (c). The DM
finds a different midpoint for a and b when the alternative payoff (as described by the act h′ in
9To clarify further, without the OS axiom —hence without cardinally identifying U — the uniqueness part of Lemma
1 would say that if
{
(φs ◦U )′
}
s∈S also represent<, there are α> 0, βs ∈R such that φs ◦U = a(φs ◦U )′+βs .
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Definition 7) is uncertain than when they are received with certainty. (Notice that this is still true
even if φs = ln for all s ∈ S; that is, if the ⊗s operator is state-independent.)
Remark 4. The mixture operator ⊗ can be extended to mix acts f , g ∈F , as we did in Remark 2.
This allows us to state the the independence axiom with respect to⊗: for all f , g ∈F , f ∼ g implies
f ⊗h ∼ g ⊗h, for all h ∈F . It is simple to prove that SOSEU satisfies such axiom, since J is affine
with respect to⊗: J ( f ⊗g )= 12 J ( f )+ 12 J (g ). This shows that⊗ is “weaker” than the objective mixture
+ of Anscombe-Aumann, since imposing the independence axiom with respect to the objective
mixture + implies that the preference satisfies SEU.
We can now adapt Axiom CCS from Section 4.3 to the present setting:
Axiom (State-wise Cardinal Symmetry - SCS). For all a,b ∈ V and f ∈F , (a⊗s b)s f ∼ (a⊗s′ b)s f
for all s, s′ ∈ S.
The act (a⊗s b)s f is equal to f in all states different from s ∈ S and equal to a⊗s b in state s.
If it is indifferent to (a⊗s′ b)s f , it means that the state-dependent utility midpoint of a,b in state
s is indifferent to the state-dependent utility midpoint of a,b in state s′. By additive separability
and the definition of ⊗s , 1/2φs(U (a))+1/2φs(U (b)) = φs(U (a⊗s b)) = φs(U (a⊗s′ b)), for all a,b ∈
V , implying that a ⊗s′ b is the also the midpoint of a,b in state s. Since this holds for all states,
midpoints are state-independent.
The main result of this section follows:
Theorem 2. Suppose there are at least 3 non-null states. A binary relation < satisfies axioms P,
M, OS, FC, P2 and SCS if and only if < has a SOSEU representation. That is, there exist a CAS
utility U : V → R, a continuous and strictly monotone φ : U (V )→ R and a p ∈ ∆(S), such that < is
represented by J :F →R given by:
J ( f )=
∫
S
(
φ◦U ) ( f )d p
If (U ′,φ′, p ′) also represents<, there are α,κ> 0, β,ζ ∈R such that p = p ′, U ′ =αU +β and φ′(αr +
β)= κφ(r )+ζ for all r ∈U (V ).
Remark 5. Following the discussion in Remark 3, it can be seen that imposing a¯b ∼ a⊗s b for
all a,b ∈ V , on top of the axioms of Theorem 2, implies that φ= φs = αid+β, for some α> 0 and
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β ∈ R. That is, the preference is SEU. Thus, we see that SEU intuitively corresponds to the case in
which the utility midpoint of a and b under certainty, a¯b, is indifferent to the utility midpoint
under uncertainty a⊗s b for every s ∈ S (thus implying Axiom SCS).
With respect to the existing literature, Theorem 2 has two advantages: first, it does not require
the existence of an objective randomization device or multiple sources of uncertainty. Second, it
does not constrain the ambiguity attitude of the decision maker, since φ is a general monotone
function. Existing characterizations, for example Grant et al. (2009), only obtain a SOSEU repre-
sentation with concave φ (cf. Corollary 1 below).
The concavity of φ can be obtained in our setting by introducing a preference for ambiguity
hedging that mimics the Uncertainty Aversion axiom of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). Recall the
definition of ⊕ provided in equation (3). We can then formulate:
Axiom (Ambiguity Hedging - AH). If f , g ∈F and α ∈ (0,1), f ∼ g implies α f ⊕ (1−α)g < f .
Corollary 1. Suppose there are at least 3 non-null states. A binary relation< satisfies axioms P, M,
OS, FC, P2, SCS and AH if and only if< has a SOSEU representation with concave φ.
To see this, notice that Axiom AH implies quasiconcavity of I (U◦ f )=∑s p(s)φ(U ( f (s))). By the
result of Debreu and Koopmans (1982), quasiconcavity implies that all φs = p(s)φ, with at most
one exception, are concave. Since they are all equal (up to a positive constant), the result follows.
This result is analogous to Theorem 3 in Grant et al. (2009), who assume Uncertainty Aversion
(i.e., a version of AH with objective act mixtures) and a condition called “Translation Invariance at
Certainty” (TIC).10
Act mixtures can also be employed to characterize the Exponential SOSEU model, using a sub-
jective version of the Weak Certainty Independence axiom of Maccheroni et al. (2006):
Axiom (Weak Certainty Independence - WCI). For all f , g ∈F , a,b ∈V , and α ∈ (0,1),
α f ⊕ (1−α)a<αg ⊕ (1−α)a ⇒ α f ⊕ (1−α)b<αg ⊕ (1−α)b
10Translation Invariance at Certainty holds if: < is locally EU at a with respect to pa and locally EU at b with respect
to pb , then pa = pb . Where,< is locally EU at a ∈ A w.r.t. p ∈∆(S) if, for all f ∈F and Epa [U ( f )]>U (a), there exists an
α¯ ∈ (0,1] such that, for all α ∈ (0, α¯], α f ⊕(1−α)a Â a and U (a)> Epa [U ( f )] implies there exists α¯ ∈ (0,1] such that, for
all α ∈ (0, α¯], a Âα f ⊕ (1−α)a. TIC is weaker than SCS, since it does not imply the state-independence of φs without
ancillary assumptions.
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Corollary 2. Suppose there are at least 3 non-null states. A binary relation< satisfies axioms P, M,
OS, FC, P2, SCS and WCI if and only if< has an Exponential SOSEU representation.
The argument is similar to that given by Strzalecki (2011). However, SCS and WCI do not char-
acterize Multiplier Preferences. The reason for this is that our derivation of SOSEU does not entail
restrictions on the curvature ofφ. Indeed, to obtain the characterization of Multiplier Preferences,
we need to add axiom AH to the assumptions of Corollary 2:
Corollary 3. Suppose there are at least 3 non-null states. A binary relation< satisfies axioms P, M,
OS, FC, P2, SCS, WCI and AH if and only if< has a Multiplier Preference representation.
Figure 5 summarizes the above results with a graphical illustration of the relations between
axioms and representations within the SOSEU model.
We conclude this section with two observations on the relation of our results with previous
characterizations of SOSEU.
Remark 6. Our characterization of SOSEU can be compared to Nau (2006) and Ergin and Gul
(2009), who identify ambiguity attitude by using multiple sources of uncertainty in lieu of an ob-
jective randomization device. In their setting, the states of the world are pairs (s1, s2) ∈ S1 × S2
and acts are functions from the states to consequences f : S1 × S2 → X . By assuming |S2| < ∞
one can interpret one such act as a “compound act”: a map from S1 to a homogeneous prod-
uct space with finitely many coordinates V = X S2 . A SEU evaluation for acts that depend only
on the source of uncertainty S2 is a CAS representation of the restriction of < to X S2 : U ( f (s1)) =∑
s2∈S2 u( f (s1, s2))q(s2). Then, the axioms of Theorem 2 can be adapted to obtain the following
representation of<:
J ( f )=
∫
S1
φ
( ∑
s2∈S2
u( f (s1, s2))q(s2)
)
d p(s1)
Our result actually requires a weaker condition than SEU over V = X S2 . Indeed, it would
be sufficient to have a CAS representation (not necessarily EU) of < on V = X S2 : U ( f (s1)) =∑
s2∈S2 us2 ( f (s1, s2)). Such U allows us to define ¯ and ⊕s and to reproduce the proof of Theorem 2
to obtain:
J ( f )=
∫
S1
φ
( ∑
s2∈S2
us2 ( f (s1, s2))
)
d p(s1)
Remark 7. Another axiomatization of SOSEU without restrictions on the function φ is that pro-
vided by Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2012). They assume a rich state space as in Savage (1954) and
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SOSEU with concave φ (Cor. 1)
SOSEU (Th. 2)
Multiplier Preferences (Cor. 3)
Exponential SOSEU (Cor. 2)
State-dependent Second-Order Utility (Lemma 4)
+ AH
+ WCI
+ WCI
+ SCS
+ AH
Figure 5: Axioms and SOSEU
the existence of an objective randomization device. Our technique can be applied to substitute
the presence of objective randomization with the assumption that the set of consequences is a
product space V :
∏
i Xi . The advantage of this extension is that we do not need to assume Risk
Independence, as the utility function is automatically affine with respect to ⊕. We can prove that
a binary relation < satisfies axioms P1-P6 of Savage, OS and FC if and only if there exist a CAS
U : V → R, a continuous increasing φ : U (V )→ R, and a non-atomic and finitely additive p ∈∆(S)
such that< is represented by J :F →R defined by:
J ( f )=
∫
S
(φ◦U )( f )d p
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Appendix
A Comparative risk attitude
In this appendix, we consider the case of homogeneous coordinates V = X 2 and provide a simple
generalization of the arguments in Section 4.3, using coordinate-wise midpoints to study coordinate-
dependent risk attitudes.
Assuming that< has a CAS representation over V , we define two derived binary relations<i ,
i = 1,2 on X by x <i y if and only if (x, z)< (y, z) for some z ∈ X . The next definition introduces
the behavioral characterization of coordinate-wise comparative risk aversion.11
Definition 8. < is more risk averse about coordinate 1 than about coordinate 2 if (x ¯2 y, z) <
(x¯1 y, z), for some z ∈ X .
The following result shows the simple characterization of this comparative notion:
Proposition 4. If < has a CAS representation over V , then < is more risk averse about coordinate
1 than about coordinate 2 if and only if there exists a concave function φ : u2(X ) → R such that
u1 =φ◦u2.
Proof. Suppose that u1 =φ◦u2 for some concave function φ, then
u1
(
x¯2 y
)=φ◦u2 (x¯2 y)
=φ
(
1
2
u2(x)+ 1
2
u2(y)
)
≥1
2
φ(u2(x))+ 1
2
φ(u2(y)
=1
2
u1(x)+ 1
2
u1(y)= u1(x¯1 y)
where the inequality follows from concavity ofφ. Hence, (x¯2 y, z)< (x¯1 y, z) for some (all) z ∈ X .
For the opposite implication, notice that u1(x ¯2 y) = u1
(
u−12
(1
2 u2(x)+ 12 u2(y)
))
, hence, by
11For brevity, in what follows we discuss the case in which the DM is more risk averse about the first coordinate than
the second, but symmetric results can be proved in the symmetric case in which the DM is is more risk averse about
the second coordinate than the first.
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defining φ= u1 ◦u−12 we have:
φ
(
1
2
u2(x)+ 1
2
u2(y)
)
=φ◦u2
(
x¯2 y
)
=u1
(
x¯2 y
)
≥u1(x¯1 y)
=1
2
u1(x)+ 1
2
u1(y)
=1
2
φ(u2(x))+ 1
2
φ(u2(y)
where the inequality follows from Definition 8. By continuity of φ, standard results imply that φ is
concave.
The previous result can be applied to behaviorally characterize state-dependent risk aversion.
Consider a state-dependent representation of a preference< defined over acts a ∈V = X S , where
S is a set of states of the world:
U (a)=∑
s∈S
us(as).
As the intuition suggests, < is more risk averse in state s than in state s′ if and only if us = φ◦us′ ,
for some concave function φ. By Proposition 4, the latter condition is equivalent to assuming that
< satisfies Definition 8. The following example illustrates:
Example 5. Suppose X = [a,b] for some 0< a < b. If U (x, y)= ln(x)+ y , x¯1 y =px y and x¯2 y =
1
2 x + 12 y . By a well-known result about the relation between the arithmetic and the geometric
means, U is more risk averse in state 1 than in state 2 and φ= ln.
B Proofs
B.1 Proof of Theorem 1
The proof of the theorem builds on several lemmas.
We begin by showing that a midpoint of A,B ∈ [V ] exists when A and B satisfy the following
preference condition:
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x∗1 y
′
1x
′
1
x∗2
y ′2
x ′2
A
C
B
Figure 6: Crossing property and midpoints
Definition 9. < satisfies Crossing at A,B ∈ [V ] if and only if there are x∗1 ∈ X1, x∗2 ∈ X2 such that
(x∗1 , x2) ∈ A and (x∗1 , y2) ∈ B for some x2, y2 ∈ X2 and (w1, x∗2 ) ∈ A and (z1, x∗2 ) ∈ B for some w1, z1 ∈
X1 with z1<1 x∗1 <w1 and y2<2 x∗2 <2 x2.
Fig. 6 provides a graphical representation of the Crossing property.
Lemma 2. Given A,B ∈ [V ], if < has an additively separable representation and Crossing holds
at A,B, then there exist (x1, x2) ∈ A and (y1, y2) ∈ B such that (x1, y2) ∼ (y1, x2) (hence, there exists
C ∈ [V ] such that C = A¯B).
Proof. Consider directly the space of utilities and given U (A) = k,U (B) = k ′ assume w.l.o.g that
U (B)>U (A). By Crossing, there are (x∗1 , x2) ∈ A and (x∗1 , y2) ∈B for some x2, y2 ∈ X2 and (w1, x∗2 ) ∈
A and (z1, x∗2 ) ∈ B for some w1, z1 ∈ X1, such that u1(z1) ≥ u1(x∗1 ) ≥ u1(w1) and u2(y2) ≥ u2(x∗2 ) ≥
u2(x2). Define a′ = (x ′1, x ′2) by u1(x ′1) = 0.5u1(x∗1 )+ 0.5u1(w1) and u2(x ′2) = 0.5u2(x∗2 )+ 0.5u2(x2).
Notice that U (a′) = U (A). Similarly, define b′ = (y ′1, y ′2) by u1(y ′1) = 0.5u1(x∗1 )+ 0.5u1(z1) and
u2(y ′2)= 0.5u2(x∗2 )+0.5u2(y2). Notice that U (b′)=U (B). Both a′ and b′ are well-defined because
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of Crossing at A,B and continuity of the preference. Then, it follows that (x ′1, y
′
2)∼ (y ′1, x ′2), indeed:
u1(x
′
1)+u2(y ′2)=0.5u1(x∗1 )+0.5u1(w1)+0.5u2(x∗2 )+0.5u2(y2)
=0.5(u1(x∗1 )+u2(y2))+0.5(u1(w1)+u2(x∗2 ))= 0.5U (B)+0.5U (A)
and
u1(y
′
1)+u2(x ′2)=0.5u1(x∗1 )+0.5u1(z1)+0.5u2(x∗2 )+0.5u2(x2)
=0.5(u1(x∗1 )+u2(x2))+0.5(u1(z1)+u2(x∗2 ))= 0.5U (A)+0.5U (B)
If Crossing does not hold at A and B , we need to take additional steps in order to identify the
midpoint of A and B . The following definition outlines such additional steps:
Definition 10. An elementary step is:
(SS) A smoothing swap of a = (x1, x2) and b = (y1, y2): The pair c = (x1, y2) and d = (y1, x2) is
substituted to a and b respectively (see Figure 7).
(II) An indifference substitution of a = (x1, x2): The vector b = (x ′1, x ′2)∼ a is substituted to a.
Suppose that a = (x1, x2) ∈ A Pareto dominates b = (y1, y2) ∈ B . A smoothing swap of a and b
generates two points c = (x1, y2) ∈C and d = (y1, x2) ∈D that are “interior,” in terms of preferences,
to a and b; i.e., a < {c,d}< b. Moreover, CAS implies the following Diagonal property (see Vind
and Grodal, 2003):
Lemma 3. If< has a CAS representation, (x1, x2) ∈ A and (y1, y2) ∈B and C = A¯B, then C = A′¯B ′
where (x1, y2) ∈ A′ and (y1, x2) ∈B ′.
Given (x1, x2) ∈ A and (y1, y2) ∈ B , if they have a utility midpoint, their midpoint is the same
as that of (x1, y2) ∈ A′ and (y1, x2) ∈ B ′. Therefore, if Crossing holds at a pair C ,D generated by a
smoothing swap of a ∈ A and b ∈B , then Lemma 2 implies the existence of a utility midpoint E of
C and D and the Diagonal property guarantees that E is also the utility midpoint of A and B .
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b = (y1, y2) ∈B
a = (x1, x2) ∈ A
d = (y1, x2) ∈D
c = (x1, y2) ∈C
Figure 7: Smoothing swap of a and b
Lemma 4. If, A Â B and for some (x1, x2) ∈ A and (y1, y2) ∈ B, u1(x1) > u1(y1) and u2(x2) > u2(y2)
then, there exists C = A¯B which can be determined in n elementary steps. The number n is the
smallest integer such that n ≥ 12
u1(x1)−u1(y1)
u2(x2)−u2(y2) .
Proof. If Crossing holds at A,B , by Lemma 2 there exists a midpoint. If not, consider (x1, x2) ∈ A
and (y1, y2) ∈ B and refer to Figure 8. Since we can always relabel the axes, it is w.l.o.g. to assume
that (x1, y2) Â (y1, x2) (or equivalently u1(x1)−u1(y1) > u2(x2)−u2(y2)). Now apply a smoothing
swap. The pairs (x1, y2) and (y1, x2) are such that (x1, x2)Â (x1, y2) ∈ A1 and (y1, y2)≺ (y1, x2) ∈B 1. If
Crossing holds at A1,B 1 then, by Lemma 2 and by the Diagonal property there exists a midpoint of
A and B . If not, the condition u1(x1)−u1(y1)> u2(x2)−u2(y2) implies A1 Â B 1. Now, find y11 ∈ X1
such that (y11 , y2) ∈ B 1. It exists by continuity and the fact that (x1, y2) ∈ A1 Â B 1 Â (y1, y2) ∈ B .
Similarly, find x11 ∈ X1 such that (x11 , x2) ∈ A1. Since Crossing does not hold at A1,B 1, then u1(x11)>
u1(y11), so (y
1
1 , y2) and (x
1
1 , x2) are strictly Pareto ranked. Apply a smoothing swap to (y
1
1 , y2) and
(x11 , x2), to find (x
1
1 , y2) ∈ B 2 and (y11 , x2) ∈ A2. If Crossing holds at A2,B 2 then by Lemma 2 and the
Diagonal property there exists a midpoint of A1 and B 1, by another application of the Diagonal
property, there exists a midpoint of A and B . If the Crossing does not hold at A2 and B 2, repeat the
argument to find A3, A4, . . . and B 3,B 4, . . . as before, until Crossing holds at An ,B n for some n.
To find n, begin by observing that u1(y11)−u1(y1)= u1(y11)+u2(y2)−u1(y1)−u2(y2)=U (B 1)−
U (B) = u1(y1)+u2(x2)−u1(y1)−u2(y2) = u2(x2)−u2(y2) and u1(x1)−u1(x11) = u1(x1)+u2(x2)−
u1(x11)−u2(x2)=U (A)−U (A1)= u1(x1)+u2(x2)−u1(x1)−u2(y2)= u2(x2)−u2(y2).
As soon as you move from A and B to A1 and B 1, one of the two conditions required by Crossing
is satisfied, because we can set, for instance, x2 = x∗2 , and the same x∗2 will satisfy the condition for
all An ,B n . To verify that Crossing holds, say, at An+1 and B n+1, we thus only need to find a suitable
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(y1, y2) ∈B
(x1, x2) ∈ A
(x1, y2) ∈ A1
(y1, x2) ∈B 1
(y11 , y2) ∈B 1
(x11 , x2) ∈ A1(y11 , x2) ∈B 2
(x11 , y2) ∈ A2
Figure 8: Elementary steps
x∗1 . A sufficient condition for that is u1(y
n
1 )≥ u1(xn1 ) with (yn1 , y2) ∈ B n+1 and (xn1 , x2) ∈ An+1. But,
by iteration if the previous calculations, u1(yn1 )= u1(y1)+n(u2(x2)−u2(y2)) and u1(xn1 )= u1(x1)−
n(u2(x2)−u(y2)). Therefore, u1(yn1 )≥ u1(xn1 ) holds whenever u1(y1)+n(u2(x2)−u2(y2))≥ u1(x1)−
n(u2(x2)−u(y2)); that is, n satisfies
n ≥ 1
2
u1(x1)−u1(y1)
u2(x2)−u2(y2)
Proof of Theorem 1. Given arbitrary (x1, x2) ∈ A and (y1, y2) ∈ B , if< satisfies Crossing at A adn B ,
a midpoint of A and B exists by Lemma 2. Suppose< does not satisfy Crossing at A,B , and assume
w.l.o.g. that A ÂB . Then for arbitrary (x1, x2) ∈ A and (y1, y2) ∈B , there are three possible cases:
1. u1(x1)> u1(y1) and u2(y2)> u2(x2)
2. u1(y1)> u1(x1) and u2(x2)> u2(y2)
3. u1(x1)≥ u1(y1) and u2(x2)≥ u2(y2)
For Case 1, we apply a smoothing swap to find c = (x1, y2) ∈C and d = (y1, x2) ∈D for some C ,D ∈
[V ]. c Â d and they are strictly Pareto ranked. Hence, we can apply Lemma 4 (the condition of
Lemma 4 is satisfied because A ÂB). Therefore, there exists a midpoint E of C ,D . By the Diagonal
property (Lemma 3), E = A¯B .
Case 2 can be treated as Case 1, up to relabeling of the axes.
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Case 3 has three subcases:
a. u1(x1)> u1(y1) and u2(x2)= u2(y2)
b. u1(x1)= u(y1) and u2(x2)> u2(y2)
c. u1(x1)> u1(y1) and u2(x2)> u2(y2)
For case a, since u2(X2) is an interval in R, if u2(y2) ∈ u2(X2)◦ or u2(y2)=maxw2∈X2 u2(w2), we can
always find ² > 0 such that u1(x1)−u1(y1) > ², u2(y2)− ² = u2(z2), and (y1, y2) ∼ (z1, z2) for some
z1 ∈ X1. By construction, u1(x1)> u1(z1), because
u1(x1)>u1(y1)+²
=u1(y1)+u2(y2)−u2(z2)
=u1(z1)+u2(z2)−u2(z2)
=u1(z1)
therefore, (z1, z2) and (x1, x2) are strictly Pareto ranked. We can thus apply Lemma 4 to prove
existence of the midpoint of A and B .
If u2(y2)=minw2∈X2 u2(w2), take ²> 0 with u1(x1)−u1(y1)> ², define u2(x2)+ ²= u2(y2)+ ²=
u2(z2), and find z1 ∈ X1 such that (z1, z2) ∈ a. By construction, u1(z1)> u1(y1), because
u1(y1)<u1(x1)−²
=u1(x1)+u2(y2)−u2(z2)
=u1(z1)+u2(z2)−u2(z2)
=u1(z1)
Therefore, (z1, z2) strictly Pareto dominates (y1, y2), and Lemma 4 can by applied.
Case b is symmetric to case a. For Case c we can directly apply Lemma 4.
B.2 Other proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. First consider the case u1(y1)+u2(y2) = k ′ =U (B) <U (A) = k. Define f :
X1 → R as follows f (x)= u1(y1)+k −2u1(x)−u2(y2). By the Triangle condition, take x = y1, then
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f (y1) = u1(y1)+ k − 2u1(y1)−u2(y2) = k − (u1(y1)+u2(y2)) = k − k ′ > 0. Again by the Triangle
condition, take x = z1, then f (z1)= u1(y1)+u1(z1)+u2(y2)−2u1(z1)−u2(y2)= u1(y1)−u1(z1)< 0,
because k ′ = u1(y1)+u2(y2)< u1(z1)+u2(y2)= k. By continuity of u1, there exists f (x∗)= 0. The
case u1(y1)+u2(y2)=U (B)>U (A) is symmetric.
Proof of Proposition 2. By CAS and CCS we have
u1(x¯1 y)=1
2
u1(x)+ 1
2
u1(y)
=u1(x¯2 y)
Hence, u1 respects the midpoint operation induced by ¯2. Axiom COS implies the ordinal equiv-
alence of u1 and u2. By the uniqueness property of Fuchs (1963, Th.15 p. 183), there are α≥ 0 and
β ∈ R such that u1 = αu2+β. α 6= 0, otherwise the additively separable representation would not
be cardinally unique.
Proof of Theorem 2. By a straightforward extension of Proposition 2 to |S| dimensions, SCS and
the fact that all φs are weakly increasing, imply that, for a non-null s′, φs′ = αsφs +βs for some
non-null s ∈ S,αs ≥ 0 and βs ∈ R. By assumption αs > 0 for at least 3 states. Therefore, J ( f ) =∑
s∈S αsφ(u( f (s)))+βs where φ , φs . Renormalizing by K =
(∑
s∈S αs
) > 0 gives a SOSEU with
p(s)= asK .
Proof of Corollary 2. The argument is similar to the one of Strzalecki (2011): WCI implies trans-
lation invariance of the functional I : B0(Σ,U (V )) → R defined by I (U ◦ f ) =∑s∈S φ(U ( f (s))) (i.e.
I (ξ+k)= I (ξ)+k for all ξ ∈B0(Σ,U (V )) and k ∈R). In turn, translation invariance forces the func-
tion φ to satisfy a generalized Pexider’s functional equations whose solution is the exponential
function φ(r )= γeαr +β for γ,α 6= 0 and arbitrary β (see Aczél, 1966, Cor. 1 p. 150).
Proof of Proposition 7. The proof is straightforward. By Savage’s result, there exist W : V → R and
a non-atomic and finitely additive p ∈ ∆(S) such that J ( f ) = ∫S W ( f )d p represents <. Therefore
< satisfies Axiom M. By P1, M and FC, for each f ∈F there exists a f ∈ V such that f ∼ a f . By
OS, there exists a cardinally unique U : V → R which is additively separable and represents the
restriction of< to V . By defining I (U ◦ f )=U (a f ), we obtain f < g if and only I (U ◦ f )≥ I (U ◦ g ).
I is well-defined by M. Since both U and W represents< on V , there exists a monotone function
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φ such that W = φ◦U . The proof that φ is continuous is identical to that in Cerreia-Vioglio et al.
(2012).
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